Abstract-The rising concern for privacy protection and the associated legal and social responsibilities have led to extensive research into the field of face de-identification over the last decade. To date, the most successful algorithms developed for face de-identification are those based on the k-Same deidentification, which guarantee a recognition rate lower than 1/k. However, the current k-Same solutions such as k-Same-Eigen and k-Same-M all rely on a decent value of k to deliver a good privacy protection. This paper proposes a departure from a fundamental aspect shared by the current k-Same solutions and thereby introduces a new member to the family which achieves perfect privacy protection for any original face regardless of the value of k.
INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in both camera technology and computing hardware have highly facilitated the effectiveness and efficiency of image and video acquisition. This capability is now widely used in a variety of scenarios to capture images of people in target environments, either for immediate inspection or for storage and subsequent analysis/sharing [1] . These improved recording capabilities, however, have ignited concerns about the privacy of people identifiable in the scenes. The Council of Europe Convention of 1950 formally declared privacy protection as a human right. This was later embodied in the 1995 Data Protection Directive of the European Union (Directive 95/46/EC), which demands the deployment of appropriate technical and organizational measures to protect private information in the course of transferring or processing such data. This legal requirement along with ethical responsibilities has restricted data sharing and utilization while various organizations may require the use of such data for research, business, academic, security and many other purposes. To comply with the regulations, de-identification has become the focus of attention by many organizations with the ultimate goal of removing all personal identifying information while protecting the utility of the data.
Various methods have been proposed for the deidentification of faces in still and moving images. These methods can be put into two categories: the ad hoc methods (such as masking, pixelation and blurring [2] [3] [4] and the kanonymity based methods (such as k-Same proposed by Newton et al. [5] ). The ad hoc methods are usually simple to implement. However, they fail to serve their purpose as they are unable to thwart the existing face recognition software [5, 6] . To achieve privacy protection, the concept of k-anonymity was introduced by Sweeney in 2002 [7] . All k-anonymity based methods de-identify k original samples with an identical aggregate sample and hence achieve privacy protection with a recognition rate guaranteed to be lower than 1/k. In the field of face de-identification, the most widely used family of kanonymity algorithms is k-Same [5] . However, all existing kSame solutions share a drawback which makes them all produce a recognition rate just below the theoretical maximum of 1/݇ while the new k-Same solution proposed in this paper achieves a recognition rate of zero.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the k-Same framework and points out the drawback shared by all existing k-Same solutions. Section 3 describes a new k-Same solution and proves that this new solution can always achieve zero recognition rate. Section 4 evaluates the proposed algorithm's ability to protect privacy and compares it to that of the existing k-Same solutions. Finally, the findings of this work are summarized and further discussed in Section 5.
II. K-SAME DE-IDENTIFICATION

A. Definition of k-Same De-identification
For the purpose of comparison with Newton et al.'s paper on k-Same [5] , the same notations are used in this paper. The definition of k-Same de-identification from their paper is repeated here.
Definition 1 k-Same (Definition 2.10 in [5] ). Given a person-specific face set ۶ ; and a face set ۶ ௗ which is kanonymized over ۶ using a preserved face de-identification function ݂: ۶ → ۶ ௗ , if ݂ is effective with respect to the claim:
Given any face image Γ ௗ = ݂ሺΓሻ for Γ ∈ ۶, there cannot exist any face recognition software for which the subject of Γ ௗ can be correctly recognized as Γ with better than 1/݇ probability.
Person-specific face set in Definition 1 means that the face set contains only one face image of each person. A deidentification method ݂: ۶ → ۶ ௗ is said to be preserved if it minimizes the information loss measured by a precision metric ‫,‪ሺΓ‬ݏݏ݈‬ ݂ሺΓሻሻ. The k-Same de-identification guarantees to be effective with respect to the claim in Definition 1 since it adds k copies of each Γ ௗ to ۶ ௗ .
B. The Common Drawback of Existing k-Same Solutions
To achieve k-anonymity, k-Same de-identification deidentify each cluster of at least k original faces with the same aggregate face and hence the name k-Same. The core problem of k-Same de-identification is to find the optimal selection of faces from the original face set to form the clusters of k faces. In [5] it is claimed that "basing each aggregate face on a cluster of homogeneous original faces minimizes information loss". This claim is correct. However, all existing k-Same deidentification solutions share a common mistake when deciding which face cluster of homogeneous faces to be selected to deidentify a given face. They all select a cluster of faces that are closest to the original, implying that the loss to be minimized or the information to be preserved is the identities of the original faces. Obviously, this conflicts with the ultimate goal of k-Same which is privacy protection.
The information that should be preserved in the deidentified faces is the various data utilities such as gender, age and expressions. This means that the correct choice of ‫,‪ሺΓ‬ݏݏ݈‬ ݂ሺΓሻሻ should be a data utility function measuring the category and/or the quantity of the target data utilities to be preserved. To date, the most cited attempt on integrating utility preservation into face de-identification has been k-Same-Select [8] . Two data utility classifiers, a gender classifier and an expression classifier, are adopted in [8] for the purpose of preserving data utility. The utility classifiers are used to partition the original face set into mutually exclusive data utility subsets. Since the resultant utility subsets contain more than k faces each (half of the set has the same gender for example), the problem then becomes how to further divide each data utility subset into clusters of k. The k-Same-Select algorithm proposed in [8] has the same drawback as all the other existing k-Same solution, as it uses the closest faces to de-identify each original face.
For the benefit of discussions in this paper, the k-Same solutions that de-identify an original face based on the faces that are closest to it are referred to as "k-Same-closest algorithms". Examples of k-Same-closest algorithms include kSame-Pixels [5] , k-Same-Eigen [5] , k-Same-M [6] and k-SameSelect [8] . In fact, k-Same-closest algorithms are the worst kSame solutions in terms of privacy protection. When no overlapping exists between any two clusters, the original face that is closest to the average/center of a cluster must lie within the cluster (see proof of Theorem 2 in the next section). The kSame-closest algorithms uses the center of a cluster to deidentify the k faces in that cluster, meaning the algorithms will always lead to a recognition rate equal to the theoretical maximum of 1/݇ . When overlapping exists between two clusters the center of a cluster can be closest to an original face from the overlapping cluster (such as that demonstrated in Fig.  1 where the inner cluster of ሼ3,4,5ሽ is formed earlier than the outer cluster ሼ1,2,6ሽ and the outer cluster has an average equal to a member of the inner cluster), giving k-Same-closest algorithms lucky escapes. However, when de-identification is performed to an original face instead of a face set the k-Sameclosest algorithms will never escape from the theoretical maximum and always generate the worst privacy protection within the k-anonymity framework. Even with a face set, experimental results (Fig. 6) show that the recognition rate of faces de-identified by the k-Same-closest algorithms always stays synchronized with the theoretical maximum of 1/݇ and force the k-Same-closest algorithms to use large k's to achieve decent privacy protection. Large values of k will not only lead to the requirement of large image gallery for the deidentification process but also to the discrimination issue with 
III. THE PROPOSED FACE DE-IDENTIFICATION
A. A Better k-Same Solution
This section presents a new approach to face deidentification, which repeats each de-identified face at least k times in the de-identified face set ۶ ௗ and therefore is a k-Same solution. However, this new k-Same solution is fundamentally different to the existing k-Same-closest algorithms. To best serve its goal of privacy protection, the proposed solution performs clustering with the aim to maximize the removal/loss of identity information in the original faces. In contrast to kSame-closest which de-identifies an original face with the aggregate of the closest face cluster to it, it de-identifies each original face Γ ∈ ۶ with an aggregate face of a cluster that, identity-wise, is furthest away from it and is hence named kSame-furthest.
This work calculates the average as the aggregate of k faces, although other measures can be used to perform the aggregation. The identity distance can be the pixel-wise Euclidean distance or the distance measured in a projected feature space such as the Eigenface space [9] or the feature space constructed by an Active Appearance Model (AAM) [10, 11] . As pointed out in [6] , k-Same is appearance based, operating entirely in the image space. As a result, 'ghosting' artefacts tend to appear due to the misalignments of the k images involved, even when images are aligned based on a small number of facial landmarks (e.g. the corners of the eyes and the tip of the nose). To prevent ghosting' artefacts in the de-identified faces, this work performs averaging of faces in the feature space constructed by an AAM. In addition, the identity distance is measured in the feature space constructed by the same AAM such that construction/training of additional feature space(s) is avoided. Fig. 2 outlines the process flow of the proposed k-Same-furthest algorithm.
Algorithm: k-Same-furthest(۶, ݇)
Inputs: Face set ۶ and privacy constraint ݇, with |۶| 2݇
An Active Appearance Model ΑΑΜ Output: De-identified face set ۶ ௗ and its AAM projection ‫ۻ‬ ௗ Uses: a face cluster ۱ = ሼΛ ሽ with a center at Λ തതത and a radius of ‫ݎ‬ , a face cluster ۱ = ሼΛ ሽ with a center at Λ തതത and a radius of ‫ݎ‬ , and dist൫Λ തതത , Λ തതത ൯ which is the distance between Λ തതത and Λ തതത .
Steps:
5 Add Λ to ۱ and remove it from ‫ۻ‬ 6 Λ തതത = Λ , ‫ݎ‬ = 0 For a given face set ۶ , the proposed k-Same-furthest projects ۶ to the feature space constructed by a trained AAM (line 2) and generates ‫ۻ‬ which is the AAM representation of the original face set. All the subsequent operations of deidentification are performed in the AAM space, i.e. on ‫ۻ‬ . Lines 5 through 39 in Fig. 2 define an iteration of the proposed de-identification process when there are more than 2݇ faces remaining in ‫.ۻ‬ In each iteration the proposed k-Same-furthest algorithm de-identifies 2݇ original faces. Fig. 3 depicts the results of a de-identification iteration for an example data set when ݇ = 2. To simplify illustration and ease understanding, a data set of scalars is used in Fig. 3 . In Figs. 2 and 3 , Λ is the original face that triggers the de-identification process (line 3 in Fig. 2 ) and Λ ଵ is the furthest face to Λ (line 7). The cluster ۱ consists of Λ and another face Λ . The cluster ۱ consists of Λ ଵ and Λ . Cluster ۱ is formed by selecting from ‫ۻ‬ (the remaining original faces) the closest faces to Λ (lines 20 and 21) and hence the closest cluster of faces to Λ that is available from ‫.ۻ‬ Cluster ۱ is formed by selecting from ‫ۻ‬ the closest faces to Λ ଵ (lines 11 and 12) and hence the furthest cluster of faces to Λ that is available from ‫.ۻ‬ Cluster ۱ may not be the closest cluster of faces to Λ in the full face set but it is the closest among the remaining original faces that have not been de-identified or added to a cluster. The same holds for cluster ۱ . To cause identity loss, the proposed k-Same-furthest deidentifies the members in a cluster with the center of the other cluster ( Fig. 3 and lines 38 and 39 in Fig. 2 ). Since cluster ۱ is identify-wise the closest cluster to Λ and ۱ the furthest, they are identity-wise the furthest away from each other, meaning the proposed algorithm achieves maximum identity loss possible.
To avoid members of a cluster become the closest original to the center of the other (i.e. the situation illustrated in Fig. 1 ), overlapping must be avoided between ۱ and ۱ . Whenever a new member is added to a cluster, k-Same-furthest checks to see whether overlapping is caused by this new member (lines 14 and 23). If so, this new member is removed from the cluster and the clustering loop for both ۱ and ۱ is stopped, as this new member is the closest to the cluster and therefore adding any other remaining face to ۱ or ۱ would cause even more overlapping between the two clusters. If clustering stopped before ۱ and ۱ has been assigned k faces each, faces closest to the center of each cluster are selected and added to the cluster to fill up the gaps. However, the centers of ۱ and ۱ are calculated using only those members that are added to them by the clustering process (i.e. before overlapping appears).
Each iteration defined by lines 5 to 39 de-identifies 2݇ faces. When |۶| is not a multiple of 2݇, there will be fewer than 2݇ faces remaining in ‫ۻ‬ (i.e. line 40 is true) after |۶|/ ሺ2݇) iterations. When this is the case, the operations defined by lines 41 to 45 are performed on each of the remaining faces. For a given remaining face from ‫,ۻ‬ line 41 identifies which of the last formed two face clusters is further to it. Then it is deidentified as the center of the further cluster (line 42 or 44), generating the maximize identity loss.
It is assumed in this work that there is no specific data utility to be preserved by the de-identification process. If there is a simultaneous requirement on the preservation of data utility, extra steps must be taken and there are two options. Option one is the approach adopted in [10] , which involves the use of a data utility classifier. The original face set is first partitioned into subsets using the data utility classifier. The kSame-furthest process is then performed on each utility subset. Option two performs k-Same-furthest face de-identification without consideration of data utility preservation and then restores the lost utility on the de-identified face generated by kSame-furthest. The second option has been tested by the work presented in [12] .
B. Correctness of the k-Same-furthest Algorithm
Theorem 1. If ۶ is a person-specific face set, ݇ is a privacy constraint, ۶ ௗ = k-Same-furthestሺ۶, ݇ሻ , ݇ > 1 , and |۶| 2݇, then ۶ ௗ satisfies k-anonymity.
Proof. Fig. 2 contains pseudo code for k-Same-furthestሺሻ.
The proposed algorithm de-identifies original faces as the center of various face clusters. For each cluster center calculated, ݇ (when |۶| is a multiple of 2݇) or more (when |۶| is not a multiple of 2݇) copies of the same center are added to ۶ ௗ , making the ݇ or more copies in ۶ ௗ indistinguishable. Or in other words, ۶ ௗ satisfies k-anonymity and always guarantees a recognition rate less than 1/݇. Theorem 1 is proved.
Furthermore, lines 38, 39, 42 and 44 ensure that each copy of a cluster center in ۶ ௗ has a one-to-one correspondence to an original face in ۶. Therefore, 1) |۶ ௗ | = |۶|; and 2) for each original face in ۶ there exists a de-identified face in ۶ ௗ . Fig. 4 , respectively.
Theorem 2. Let
Let ‫ݕ‬ Ԧ ∈ ۶ be any other face than ‫ݔ‬ Ԧ (from set ۶). Since ‫ݔ‬ Ԧ is the closest face in set ۶ to ‫ܥ‬ ሬሬሬሬԦ , hence ‫ݕ‬ Ԧ ∉ ‫܁‬ . Because ‫܁‬ ାଵ ⊂ ‫܁‬ , also hence ‫ݕ‬ Ԧ ∉ ‫܁‬ ାଵ , meaning ‫ݕ‬ Ԧ is further away from ‫ܥ‬ ାଵ ሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬԦ than ‫ݔ‬ Ԧ. Theorem 2 is proved. Note that there can be faces within C that are closer to ‫ܥ‬ ାଵ ሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬԦ than ‫ݔ‬ Ԧ.
Theorem 3.
If ۶ is a person-specific face set, ݇ is a privacy constraint, ݇ > 1 , |۶| 2݇ , ۶ ௗ = k-Same-furthestሺ۶, ݇ሻ , k-Same-furthestሺ۶, ݇ሻ uses distሺ߁ ଵ , ߁ ଶ ሻ to measure the identity distance between any two faces ߁ ଵ and ߁ ଶ , and Γ ௗ ∈ ۶ ௗ , there cannot exist any face recognition software that measures identity distance with distሺ߁ ଵ , ߁ ଶ ሻ to correctly match Γ ௗ with the subject of its original face in ۶.
Proof. Since ۱ ାଵ is composed of ۱ and ‫ݔ‬ Ԧ and Theorem 2
states that no other face in ۶ can be closer to ‫ܥ‬ ାଵ ሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬԦ than ‫ݔ‬ Ԧ, the face that is closest to ‫ܥ‬ ାଵ ሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬԦ must be a member of ۱ ାଵ . In other words, the face that is closest to the average of a cluster must be a member of that cluster when clusters are formed in the way described in Theorem 2, i.e. selecting the face that is to closest the current average and adding it to the cluster. This is exactly the way how k-Same-furthestሺሻ forms its clusters (lines 11-12 and 20-21). However, k-Same-furthestሺሻ forms two clusters simultaneously, meaning ۱ in Theorem 2 is the union of ۱ and ۱ in k-Same-furthestሺሻ. A member in ۱ can only be the closest face to the average of ۱ when there is overlapping between ۱ and ۱ , and vice versa. Since k-Same-furthestሺሻ (lines 14 and 23 in Fig. 2 ) ensures that no overlapping is allowed between ۱ and ۱ , among the remaining original faces the face that is closest to the average of ۱ must be a member of ۱ according to Theorem 2, and vice versa. As k-Same-furthestሺሻ never de-identifies the members of a cluster as the average of that cluster, the deidentified faces (average of this cluster) can never be matched with their corresponding original faces (faces rather than members of this cluster), as long as the matching process uses the same distance measure as k-Same-furthestሺሻ. Theorem 3 is proved. Theorem 3 means that as long as the recognition software uses the same distance measure as itself, k-Same-furthestሺሻ guarantees to thwarts face recognition software for every face in its ۶ ௗ and therefore the best k-Same solution in terms of privacy protection. 
IV. EXPERIMENTS
A. Dataset
Experiments in this work were conducted with the IMM dataset [13] , which contains images of 40 subjects. Only images with a near-frontal pose were used. These include a neutral, a happy and an arbitrary expression face images per subject. There is variation in head pose among the neutral as well as the happy faces. There is variation in both pose and lighting among the arbitrary expression faces. Fig. 5 shows some example face images from the IMM dataset.
B. Test Design
Privacy protection ability of the proposed k-Same-furthest algorithm is measured through recognition experiments using Eigenface technique and the Eigenface equivalent in the AAM space (i.e. that is used in k-Same-furthest). Cropped face images showing only the region inside the outline of the AAMfitted shape are used in the experiments. 70% of the subjects are used for training the Eigenface or the AAM space with cropped original images. In testing, all cropped original images with various expressions are used as the gallery and the deidentified images as the probes. All results reported are based on randomly selecting ten different training and gallery/probe sets and computing the average recognition rate over all configurations.
C. k-Same-furthest Outperforms k-Same-closest
Fig . 6 shows the rank-1 recognition rates for the cropped original faces and the faces de-identified using either k-Same-M or the proposed k-Same-furthest. As shown in Fig. 6 , when the same distance measure is used, k-Same-furthest always produces a recognition rate of zero. When PCA representation of face images is used the face recognition software, the recognition rates of the k-Same-furthest de-identified faces are slightly above zero whilst stay far lower than k-Same-M faces. When the face recognition software represents faces as AAM parameters, the recognition rates of the faces de-identified by k-Same-M remain around 2-3% below the theoretical maximum of 1/݇. When PCA representation is used by the face recognition software, the recognition rates of the k-Same-M faces is lower than those calculated by the AAM-based recognition but still stay much higher than the recognition rate achieved by k-Same-furthest. Regardless of which feature space the recognition software uses to represent face images, the recognition rate of the k-Same-M faces always stay synchronized with the theoretical maximum of 1/݇ . This forces k-Same-M to use large k's in order to achieve decent privacy protection. With k-Same-furthest, the recognition rate stay at zero or slightly above zero, allowing decent privacy protection to be achievable with small k's. This means that for a required level of privacy protection, k-Same-furthest requires a smaller k than k-Same-closest and in turn delivers a better discrimination among faces in the de-identified face set. After all, there are k copies of each face in the set. Fig. 7 is the first face to be de-identified, the same face will always be selected as Λ ଵ (line 7 in Fig. 2 ) regardless of k and the selected Λ ଵ is the furthest face to it over the entire face gallery. The cluster of faces that is used to de-identify it is the cluster of k faces that are closest to face Λ ଵ . Since Λ ଵ is the same regardless of k, nearly identical de-identified faces are generated by k-Same-furthest for each original face in Fig. 7 over various values of k. When the original face is not the first to de-identify the face that is furthest away from it over the entire face gallery might have already been taken by the previously formed clusters. As a result, a different Λ ଵ and hence a different de-identified face will be generated for different k values. Fig. 8 displays the visual results of the proposed k-Samefurthest algorithm where no preservation of data utility is implemented and hence the entire image gallery containing faces with various expressions and head poses is used to form the face clusters. The de-identified faces generated with various values of k display various expressions and head poses but a nearly identical identity. When k is small the de-identified faces tend to display an expression and a head pose of an extreme from the gallery. As k increases, the cluster on which the de-identified face is based becomes more and more diverse. As a result, the de-identified face converges to the average of the half gallery that is further to the original.
As displayed in Figs. 7 and 8, the de-identified faces for each original appear significantly different to their corresponding originals.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper refers to k-Same-Pixel/-Eigen and all their current extensions as the k-Same-closest algorithms and has pointed out that they share the fundamental drawback of deidentifying faces based on faces closest to them. This means that the k-Same-closest algorithms are actually trying to minimize identity loss instead of maximising it and restricts the k-Same-closest algorithms to achieve decent privacy protection at the cost of large values of k, which in turn lead to the demand for a large image gallery or otherwise lack of discrimination among the de-identified faces (number of distinctive faces in the de-identified face set is equal to or less than size of the gallery divided by k).
In contrast to k-Same-closest algorithms, the proposed kSame-furthest algorithm de-identifies faces based on the faces that are furthest away from them and hence maximizes identity loss, achieving the perfect privacy protection regardless of the value of k.
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